of large-scale strikes. Continued resistance delayed serious consideration of the matter for a considerable while, but in 1972 a panel chaired by John Foster recommended the development of limited, selective, and regional options for the SIOP. The considerations that shaped the Foster panel's report paved the way for the enunciation in 1974 of the "Schlesinger Doctrine" of limited nuclear options.
The third article, by Steve Marsh, analyzes the Truman and Eisenhower administrations' policies toward Iran during the oil crisis of [1950] [1951] [1952] [1953] [1954] . The traditional interpretation of these events has been that the change of administrations in early 1953 caused U.S. policy to shift to a more aggressive stance, culminating in the August 1953 coup that overthrew the government of Mohammed Mossadegh. In an article in the ªrst issue of the Journal of Cold War Studies, Francis Gavin challenged this view, arguing that the decision to proceed with the coup was spurred not by the change of administration but by the rapid U.S. military buildup that followed the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950. This buildup, Gavin argued, gave U.S. ofªcials greater conªdence of staving off the Soviet Union and of being able to respond more forcefully to regional crises. Like Gavin, Marsh believes that if the Truman administration had still been in power in mid-1953, it too would have proceeded with Operation Ajax (the codename for the coup) in ousting Mossadegh's government. But Marsh, unlike Gavin, does not believe that the U.S. military buildup was the primary impetus behind the continuity of policy. Instead, he emphasizes the shared objectives and assumptions of the Truman and Eisenhower administrations vis-à-vis Iran. The Truman administration, he argues, was already adopting a more forceful approach by the time Dwight Eisenhower came to ofªce, and the new administration merely continued that policy to install a more suitable government.
The ªnal article, by Michael Goodman, reassesses the case of Klaus Fuchs, the German-born physicist who worked on the Manhattan Project in the United States during World War II and secretly provided extremely important nuclear weapons information to the Soviet Union. Fuchs's arrest on charges of espionage in February 1950 came as a jolt to the U.S.-British alliance. Goodman explores the bureaucratic politics of the case on both the British and the American sides and highlights the mistrust that the episode engendered. He shows that ofªcials on both sides sought to promote their own agencies' interests, even if that required active deception. In particular, the director of the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), J. Edgar Hoover, not only was willing to deceive MI5, the main British counterintelligence agency, but was also intent on strengthening the FBI in its rivalry with other U.S. intelligence organizations. The bureaucratic maneuvers on both sides hindered thorough investigation of Fuchs's activities. The case thus sheds interesting light on the domestic and international repercussions of a celebrated breach of security.
The issue concludes with our customary section of twenty-four book reviews.
